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Sterling financial markets
Overview
Financial market sentiment deteriorated markedly over the
review period.  Volatility increased across a range of markets,
as investors tried to reduce their exposure to risky assets and
sought refuge in so-called ‘safe haven’ assets.  Contacts noted
that the functioning of some markets had, at times, become
impaired.
Fiscal developments continued to be a key influence on
financial markets.  Existing concerns about the sustainability of
fiscal positions and the implications for banking sectors spread
to some euro-area economies that had previously been less
affected.  Spreads between the yields of sovereign bonds of
several euro-area countries and those of German government
bonds remained elevated, and in some cases rose further.  The
process around raising the federal debt ceiling in the
United States and a subsequent downgrade by the ratings
agency Standard & Poor’s added to uncertainty among
investors.
These developments interacted with, and were compounded
by, concerns about the sustainability of the global economic
recovery that were reflected in downward revisions to growth
forecasts in a number of major economies.  As these concerns
intensified, equity markets in the United Kingdom and abroad
fell sharply and the yields on gilts and government bonds in a
number of other countries reached historic lows.  There was a
sharp increase in the price of assets that were perceived to be
relatively safe such as gold and the Swiss franc (Chart 1).
These factors contributed to market participants pushing out
expectations for future monetary policy tightening in major
economies, including the United Kingdom.  Contacts also
started to place greater weight on the possibility of further
monetary easing in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.
Primary capital markets experienced low levels of activity over
the period.  Issuance of debt or equity by UK private
non-financial corporations slowed.  And term issuance in
public markets by UK banks fell sharply. 
Monetary policy and short-term interest rates
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
maintained Bank Rate at 0.5% and the stock of purchased
assets at £200 billion.
UK CPI inflation remained above target throughout the review
period.  But a slowdown in the pace of economic activity in the
United Kingdom and abroad, together with renewed volatility
in financial markets, contributed to market participants
pushing out their expectations for the timing of an increase in
Bank Rate.  Contacts also began to place greater weight on the
possibility of further monetary easing.
Consistent with this, a Reuters poll released shortly after the
end of the review period showed that the majority of
economists were not expecting the MPC to begin raising
Bank Rate until end-2012.  This was one year later than at the
time of the previous Bulletin.  Reuters also surveyed
economists about the probability they attached to the MPC
conducting further asset purchases at some point.  The median
respondent attached a 35% probability to this, up from 20% in
the 29 June survey, which was the first time since
This article reviews developments in sterling financial markets, including the Bank’s official
operations, between the 2011 Q2 Quarterly Bulletin and 26 August 2011.
(1) The article also
summarises market intelligence on selected topical issues relating to market functioning.
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) On 10 August 2011, the Swiss National Bank announced additional measures to increase the
supply of Swiss franc liquidity.
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February 2011 that Reuters had asked about the prospects for
further asset purchases.
Against this backdrop, forward sterling overnight index swap
(OIS) rates fell at all maturities (Chart 2).  According to this
measure, by the end of the review period market participants
had pushed out their expectations of a 25 basis point increase
in Bank Rate by the MPC until the second half of 2013, about a
year and a half later than at the time of the previous Bulletin.
Shorter-term forward sterling OIS rates were at times below
Bank Rate in August.  Some contacts thought this reflected an
increased, though still small, probability of a reduction in
sterling overnight interest rates as a result of further monetary
easing.  But the majority of market participants thought these
movements were amplified by reduced liquidity in markets
over the summer. 
Market participants also pushed out their expectations of
monetary policy tightening elsewhere.  The European Central
Bank (ECB) raised its main policy rate by 25 basis points to
1.5% in July.  Forward euro OIS rates ended the period lower,
however.  This might partly reflect market participants revising
their expectations about further policy tightening by the ECB
following the intensification of concerns about the global
economic outlook and sustainability of fiscal positions in
several euro-area countries.  Forward euro OIS rates may also
have been affected by changes in the ECB’s liquidity provision.
The ECB conducted a supplementary long-term repo operation
with a maturity of approximately six months in August — the
first since May 2010.  Contacts thought that the provision of
additional liquidity in excess of that necessary for banks to
meet their reserves targets might keep overnight money
market rates below the ECB’s main policy rate.
In the United States, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) completed its planned $600 billion asset purchase
programme.  At its August meeting, the FOMC stated that it
anticipated that economic conditions were likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least
through mid-2013.  It also said that it discussed the range of
policy tools available to promote a stronger economic
recovery in a context of price stability.  Forward US dollar OIS
rates fell at all maturities (Chart 2) and contacts began to
attach a greater probability to the FOMC conducting further
asset purchases in the future.
Long-term interest rates
A reappraisal of global growth prospects led to a fall in
long-term government bond yields in the major developed
economies.  Ten-year nominal gilt yields fell by around
80 basis points over the review period (Chart 3) to
historically low levels.  
Part of this fall in longer-term gilt yields reflected lower policy
rate expectations in the near term, which has lowered
shorter-term interest rates (Chart 4).  But nominal interest
rates also fell at longer horizons, which should be less affected
by current cyclical developments (Chart 4).  The fall in one
such measure — five-year nominal interest rates, five years
forward — was largely accounted for by a fall in forward real
interest rates (Chart 5).  This might suggest that market
participants revised down their views on the longer-term
growth potential of major developed economies.
Contacts said a ‘flight to liquidity’ also contributed towards
the decline in gilt yields.  This might suggest that investors
were more willing to forego returns in order to hold gilts and
other highly rated government bonds rather than less liquid
bonds at a time when concerns about debt sustainability in
some euro-area countries had intensified.  This intensification
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(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s overnight index swap (OIS) curves.
Chart 2 Instantaneous forward interest rates derived













Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) Spot interest rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
(b) Derived from government bonds issued by France and Germany.
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government of the euro area and EU institutions on 21 July of
an additional support package for Greece, and measures to
enhance the European Financial Stability Facility and the
European Stability Mechanism.
Existing concerns about the sustainability of fiscal positions
and the implications of these for banking sectors spread to
some euro-area economies that had previously been less
affected.  Yields of Italian and Spanish ten-year government
bonds rose to over 6%, and their spreads to German
government bonds of similar maturity rose sharply (Chart 6).
The spread between French and German government bond
yields also widened over the period.  These moves were
mirrored in sovereign credit default swap (CDS) premia, which
in some cases exceeded the increase in government bond
spreads.  Towards the end of the period, the ECB expanded its
purchases of government bonds under its Securities Markets
Programme with contacts reporting purchases of Italian and
Spanish government bonds.  Subsequently, Spanish and
Italian government bond yields fell, and spreads to German
government bond yields narrowed.
The process around raising the federal debt ceiling in the
United States and a subsequent downgrade by the ratings
agency Standard & Poor’s to AA+ added to uncertainty
among investors.
Bank funding markets 
Debt issuance by major UK lenders in public term funding
markets fell sharply over the review period (Chart 7).
Contacts mainly attributed this change in primary market
conditions to the increasing concern about the implications for
banks of sovereign default risks in the euro area.  UK banks
have modest direct exposures to the sovereign debt of the
most vulnerable countries in the euro area, but have larger
exposures to real-economy lending in those countries and
indirect exposures through their links with other major banking
systems.  Contacts thought that these concerns overshadowed
the bank stress-test results published in July by the European
Banking Authority.
While public term funding markets had largely closed over the
review period, private issuance in June and July had increased
above its monthly average earlier in the year according to
contacts.  Moreover, UK banks have reportedly remained
active in private markets in August.  Contacts thought this
reflected the bespoke nature of the private market, where
terms of the deals are tailored to match the preferences of
investors.  Also, investors in the private market tended to be
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Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) Forward interest rates derived from the Bank’s government liability and inflation swap curves.
(b) Derived from government bonds issued by France and Germany.
Chart 5 Changes in international five-year interest rates,
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Banks continued to reduce their use of the Bank’s Special
Liquidity Scheme (SLS) and the results from the Bank’s indexed
long-term repo (ILTR) operations suggested little change in
banks’ demand for sterling liquidity from the Bank (see box on
pages 188–90).
Contacts were, however, increasingly concerned that the
persistence or intensification of worries surrounding the fiscal
positions of some euro-area member countries could threaten
the reopening of public term funding markets in September,
traditionally a month of strong issuance.  A prolonged closure
of the market could make it harder for banks to improve the
resilience of their balance sheets without reducing lending
further to the real economy.  After the end of the review
period there has been some public issuance of covered bonds
by UK banks.
Major UK banks’ CDS premia, one indicator of longer-term
wholesale funding costs, rose markedly over the review period.
On average they reached levels last seen in Spring 2009.  CDS
premia of continental European banks, on average, reached
their highest level on record (Chart 8).
Alongside the increase in long-term wholesale funding costs
for UK banks, the spread of short-term interbank borrowing
rates relative to OIS rates rose slightly for sterling (Chart 9).
The spread rose more sharply for euro, largely reflecting the
fall in OIS rates.  Contacts thought that the increase in the
Libor-OIS spread reflected broader funding stresses felt by
some euro-area banks.
Forward spreads implied by derivatives settling on Libor
were consistent with market participants anticipating that
short-term bank funding costs might remain elevated in
the months ahead (Chart 9).  Spot and forward Libor-OIS
spreads remained, however, well below the levels reached in
late 2008.
Contacts noted that the increase in short-term bank funding
costs was accompanied by a further shortening of the























Sources:  Bank of England, Dealogic and Bank calculations. 
(a) Includes debt issued by Banco Santander, Bank of Ireland, Barclays, Co-operative Financial
Services, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, National Australia Bank, Nationwide, Northern Rock
and RBS.  Term issuance refers here to securities with an original contractual maturity or
earliest call date of at least 18 months.  It includes subordinated lower Tier 2 and Tier 3
capital instruments with debt features.
(b) Senior debt issued under HM Treasury’s Credit Guarantee Scheme.
(c) Medium-term notes.
(d) Asset-backed securities.
(e) Commercial mortgage-backed securities.
(f) Residential mortgage-backed securities. 
(g) Data are up to 26 August 2011.
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Source:  Markit Group Limited.
(a) Unweighted averages of five-year, senior CDS prices.
(b) Average of BBVA, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Santander,
Société Générale, UBS and UniCredit.
(c) Average of Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Morgan Stanley.
(d) Average of Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, RBS and Standard Chartered.
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(a) Three-month Libor-OIS spreads derived from Libor fixings and OIS rates.
(b) Forward spreads derived using data as at 26 August.  The squares are implied forward spreads
using forward Libors derived from forward rate agreements, and forward OIS rates derived
from spot OIS contracts.
Chart 9 International three-month spot and forward
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Operations within the sterling monetary
framework and other market operations
Over the review period, the level of reserves held by
commercial banks at the Bank continued to be determined by
(i) the stock of reserves injected via asset purchases, (ii) the
level of reserves supplied by long-term repo open market
operations (OMOs), and (iii) the net impact of other sterling
(‘autonomous factor’) flows across the Bank’s balance sheet.
The box on pages 192–93 provides more detail on the
Asset Purchase Facility (APF).  This box describes the Bank’s
operations within the sterling monetary framework over the
review period, and other market operations.
Operational Standing Facilities
Average daily use of the Operational Standing Lending Facility
was £3 million in the June maintenance period and £13 million
in the July maintenance period.  The facility had not previously
been used since the March 2009 maintenance period.  Usage
in June and July was consistent with the facility’s purpose of
keeping market rates in line with Bank Rate by providing a
means for banks to manage unexpected frictional payment
shocks which might arise.(1)
Since 5 March 2009, the rate paid on the Operational Standing
Deposit Facility has been zero, while all reserves account
balances have been remunerated at Bank Rate.  Reflecting this,
average use of the deposit facility was £0 million in each of the
maintenance periods under review.
Indexed long-term repo OMOs
As part of its provision of liquidity insurance to the banking
system, the Bank conducts indexed long-term repo (ILTR)
operations.  The Bank offers reserves via ILTRs once each
calendar month;  typically, the Bank will conduct two
operations with a three-month maturity and one operation
with a six-month maturity in each calendar quarter.
Participants are able to borrow against two different sets of
collateral.  One set corresponds with securities eligible in the
Bank’s short-term repo operations (‘narrow collateral’), and
the other set contains a broader class of high-quality debt
securities that, in the Bank’s judgement, trade in liquid markets
(‘wider collateral’).
The Bank offered £5 billion via three-month ILTR operations on
both 14 June and 12 July, and £2.5 billion via a six-month
operation on 16 August (Table 1). 
The stop-out spread — the difference between clearing
spreads for wider and narrow collateral — is an indicator of
potential stresses in the market.  In the June and July
three-month operations, this spread reached successive lows
of 15 and 12 basis points, continuing a trend since March
(Chart A).  The June operation also had a lower participation
than any operation to date, with a cover ratio of 0.62, while
the proportion of three-month funds allocated to wider
collateral reached a new low in July of 4.9%, slightly lower
than in the previous quarter, possibly suggesting that demand
for funding, especially against wider collateral, had not
increased.  
Table 1 Indexed long-term repo operations
Total Collateral set summary
Narrow Wider
14 June 2011 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000 
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 3,100 2,450  650 
Amount allocated (£ millions) 3,050  2,450  600 
Cover 0.62 0.49 0.13
Clearing spread above Bank Rate (basis points) 0 15 
Stop-out spread (basis points)(b) 15
12 July 2011 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 5,610 5,365 245 
Amount allocated (£ millions) 5,000 4,755  245 
Cover 1.12 1.07 0.05 
Clearing spread above Bank Rate (basis points) 0 12 
Stop-out spread (basis points)(b) 12
16 August 2011 (six-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 2,500
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 4,081 2,445 1,636 
Amount allocated (£ millions) 2,500 1,894 606 
Cover 1.63 0.98 0.65 
Clearing spread above Bank Rate (basis points) 0 53 
Stop-out spread (basis points)(b) 53
(a) Due to the treatment of paired bids, the sum of bids received by collateral set may not equal total bids
received.
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In contrast, the six-month operation in August recorded both
the highest cover since November 2010, and the highest
stop-out spread to date, at 53 basis points.  Contacts did not
attribute this to market stress at the time of the operation.  
Reserves provided via ILTRs in June, July and August more than
offset the maturity of the previous ILTR operations.
Consequently, the stock of liquidity provided through
longer-term operations increased a little.
The Bank has recently moved to allocating on — or close to —
its relative supply schedule, instead of at the lowest accepted
bid spread.(2)
Discount Window Facility
The Discount Window Facility (DWF) provides liquidity
insurance to the banking system by allowing eligible banks to
borrow gilts against a wide range of collateral.  On 5 July 2011,
the Bank announced that the average daily amount
outstanding in the 30-day DWF between 1 January and
31 March 2011 was £0 million.  The Bank also announced that
the average daily amount outstanding in the 364-day DWF
between 1 January and 31 March 2010 was £0 million.
Eligible collateral in the Bank’s operations
On 1 July 2011, the Bank introduced two changes to the
eligibility criteria for collateral accepted in its operations.  First,
the Bank introduced changes to eligibility criteria for sovereign,
central bank and supranational debt taken as narrow and wider
collateral in its operations on 1 July 2011.  This had initially
been announced on 11 February 2011.
Second, an amendment requiring transaction documentation
to be made available online for asset-backed securities and
covered bonds accepted as collateral under the DWF and ILTR
came into force on 1 July 2011.  This had been initially
announced on 30 November 2010.(3)
Other operations
Special Liquidity Scheme
The Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) was introduced in
April 2008 to improve the liquidity position of the banking
system by allowing banks and building societies, for a limited
period, to swap their high-quality mortgage-backed and other
securities for UK Treasury bills for up to three years.  The
Scheme was designed to finance part of the overhang of
illiquid assets on banks’ balance sheets by exchanging them
temporarily for more easily tradable assets. 
When the drawdown period for the SLS closed at the end of
January 2009, £185 billion of UK Treasury bills had been lent
under the SLS.  In order to prevent a refinancing ‘cliff’, the Bank
held bilateral discussions with all users of the Scheme to
ensure that there were funding plans in place to reduce their
use of the Scheme in a smooth fashion.  The impact of these
expected repayment plans are shown in aggregate in Chart B,
along with the repayment profile based on counterparties’
contractual repayment obligations, and the profile of actual
repayments to date.  Despite difficult market conditions,
participants continued to make repayments over the quarter:
by end-August 2011, £168 billion had been repaid, compared
with £148 billion at end-May 2011.
US dollar repo operations
From 11 May 2010 the Bank reintroduced weekly fixed-rate
tenders with a seven-day maturity to offer US dollar liquidity,
in co-ordination with other central banks, in response to
renewed strains in the short-term funding market for
US dollars at the time.  This was subsequently extended to
1 August 2011.  On 29 June 2011, the Bank announced a further
extension of its temporary swap line with the Federal Reserve
to 1 August 2012.  As of 26 August 2011, there had been no use
of the Bank’s facility.
Euro swap agreement
On 25 August 2011, the ECB and the Bank announced an
extension of their sterling-euro liquidity swap arrangement to
28 September 2012.  This facility was initially established on
17 December 2010.  Under the agreement, if requested, the
Bank of England will provide the ECB with sterling in exchange
for euro up to a limit of £10 billion. 
Bank of England balance sheet:  capital portfolio
The Bank holds an investment portfolio that is approximately
the same size as its capital and reserves (net of equity
holdings, for example in the Bank for International
Settlements, and the Bank’s physical assets) and aggregate
cash ratio deposits.  The portfolio consists of
sterling-denominated securities.  Securities purchased by the
Bank for this portfolio are normally held to maturity;
nevertheless sales may be made from time to time, reflecting
for example, risk management, liquidity management or
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prepared to lend to banks.  In addition, the largest US prime
MMFs reduced their exposures to euro-area banks during the
review period;  these moves reflected both an overall fall in
their assets under management and in the relative weight of
European banks in their portfolios. 
Signs of stress were also observed in the cross-currency
funding markets.  The difference between the cost of raising
US dollar funding by borrowing in euro and swapping via the
foreign exchange market and the cost of direct US dollar
borrowing rose markedly (Chart 10).  The spread
remained well below levels in late 2008, which contacts
thought might reflect both a reduced need for dollar funding
by euro-area banks as some of their dollar assets have
matured or been sold, and the existence of central bank
dollar swap facilities.  Contacts noted the recent usage of the
US dollar repo operations offered by the Swiss National Bank
(SNB) and the ECB, albeit that usage was small compared
to 2008.  The cost of US dollar funding via sterling was little
changed. 
Corporate capital markets 
Global equity prices fell sharply from mid-July (Chart 11).  In
the United Kingdom, the FTSE All-Share index fell by 10% in
the first week of August and ended the review period 14%
lower.  Equity prices fell across a range of sectors, but the falls
in financials were particularly large.
According to contacts, these falls predominantly reflected two
factors.  First, deteriorating financial market sentiment led
investors to reduce their exposure to markets where returns
were perceived to be more uncertain — such as equity markets
— and invest instead in assets that were seen to generate
relatively safe returns.
Second, the perceived deterioration in the strength of the
global recovery led investors to reassess the outlook for
corporate earnings.  For example, the Bank of America/Merrill
Lynch Fund Manager survey for August reported that the net
balance of respondents expecting the global profit outlook to
improve over the next twelve months had fallen to -30%, from
+9% in May.
The declines in equity prices were accompanied by a marked
rise in option-implied volatility, a forward-looking measure of
uncertainty (Chart 12).  Contacts attributed this in part to the
relatively illiquid conditions that prevailed in equity derivatives
markets as widening bid-offer spreads discouraged
participation.
Perhaps consistent with a re-evaluation of corporate earnings
prospects, the spread of corporate bond yields over
government bonds rose sharply over the review period.  This
The portfolio currently includes around £3.3 billion of gilts and
£0.5 billion of other debt securities.  Over the period from
21 May 2011 to 26 August 2011, gilt purchases were made in
accordance with the quarterly announcements on 1 April 2011
and 1 July 2011.
(1) For more information on the facility, see Part 2 of the Bank’s Red Book at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/index.htm.
(2) For further discussion of this issue, see the speech by Paul Fisher, ‘Recent
developments in the sterling monetary framework’, 30 March 2011, available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech487.pdf.
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was particularly noticeable for non-investment grade bonds,
which contacts attributed to an investor preference for assets
considered safest (Chart 13).  The increase in corporate bond
spreads also coincided with increased activity in purchase
auctions of the Bank’s Corporate Bond Secondary Market
Scheme (see box on pages 192–93 for further detail). 
Despite the rise in spreads, investment-grade non-financial
corporate bond yields ended the review period lower,
reflecting the falls in yields on government bonds.  In
contrast, yields on non-investment grade corporate bonds
rose (Chart 14).
Turning to primary markets, bond issuance by UK private
non-financial corporations (PNFCs) slowed (Chart 15).
Contacts in part attributed this to the challenging conditions
in secondary markets, although issuance is typically lower
during the summer.  Reflecting the strong start to the year,
cumulative gross issuance in 2011 to date was still above its
average between 2003 and 2008.  But more recently, contacts
raised concerns that weak issuance might persist until the
macroeconomic outlook was clearer. 
The slowdown in corporate bond issuance was accompanied
by ongoing negative net equity issuance in June and July as
gross equity issuance remained weak and share buyback
activity increased (Chart 16).  There had been few initial public
offerings in recent months, which contacts attributed to
concerns that investors would be unwilling to partake during
volatile secondary market conditions.  Contacts also suggested
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Asset purchases(1)
The Bank did not undertake any Asset Purchase Facility (APF)
gilt purchases over the review period.  As a result, the stock of
gilts held by the APF in terms of the amount paid to sellers
remained at £198.3 billion.(2)
Purchases of high-quality private sector assets financed by the
issuance of Treasury bills and the Debt Management Office’s
(DMO’s) cash management operations continued, in line with
the arrangements announced on 29 January 2009.(3)
Table 1 summarises operations under the APF over the review
period by type of asset.
Corporate bonds
The Bank continued to offer to purchase and sell corporate
bonds via the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme.  The
Scheme continues to serve a useful role as a backstop,
particularly during periods of market uncertainty.
Over the review period, activity in the Bank’s auctions
continued to be driven by broader market conditions.  Sales of
corporate bonds continued in June, following the pattern
observed in the previous Bulletin, while purchases fell.  But
through July and August the Bank was a small net buyer of
bonds.  As of 25 August 2011 the Bank’s portfolio totalled
£1,115 million, compared to £1,153 million at the end of the
previous review period.  Market contacts suggested that this
pattern of usage of the Scheme reflected its role as a backstop,
given the deterioration of market sentiment over the review
period.
Commercial paper
The Bank continued to offer to purchase sterling-denominated
investment-grade commercial paper (CP) issued by companies
that make a material contribution to UK economic activity.
On 15 November 2010, the Bank provided twelve months’
notice of its intention to withdraw this scheme, reflecting a
sustained improvement in the sterling commercial paper
market.
Average spreads on sterling-denominated CP over the review
period were broadly stable and remain well below the levels
seen in early 2009.  Usage of the APF Commercial Paper
Facility remained at £0 million over the period.
Secured commercial paper facility
The Bank continued to offer to purchase secured commercial
paper (SCP) backed by underlying assets that are short term
and provide credit to companies or consumers that support
economic activity in the United Kingdom.(4) The Bank
announced on 15 November 2010 that it had made a
Table 1 APF transactions by type (£ millions)
Week ending(a) Commercial paper Secured commercial  Gilts Corporate bond Total(b)
paper Purchases Sales
19 May 2011(c)(d) 0 30 198,275 1,153 199,458
26 May 2011 0 0 0 3 29 -26
2 June 2011 0 0 0 0 4 -4
9 June 2011 0 0 0 0 5 -5
16 June 2011 0 0 0 8 0 8
23 June 2011 0 30 0 0 0 30
30 June 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 July 2011 0 0 0 2 14 -12
14 July 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 July 2011 0 30 0 0 0 30
28 July 2011 0 0 0 0 2 -2
4 August 2011 0 0 0 0 10 -10
11 August 2011 0 0 0 16 0 16
18 August 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 August 2011 0 30 0 8 0 38
Total financed by a deposit from the DMO(d)(e) – 30 – 271  301
Total financed by central bank reserves(d)(e) – – 198,275 844  199,119
Total asset purchases(d)(e) – 30 198,275  1,115  199,420
(a) Week-ended amounts are for purchases in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, and for sales in terms of the value at which the Bank initially purchased the securities.  All amounts are on a trade-day basis, rounded to the
nearest million.  Data are aggregated for purchases from the Friday to the following Thursday.
(b) Weekly values may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) Measured as amount outstanding as at 19 May 2011.
(d) In terms of proceeds paid to counterparties less redemptions at initial purchase price on a settled basis. 
(e) Data may not sum due to assets maturing over the period.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 193
buyouts and a low number of fast-growing companies seeking
equity financing.
Foreign exchange
The sterling exchange rate index (ERI) ended the period
broadly unchanged (Chart 17).  Over the period, sterling
appreciated by 1% against the US dollar, but was little changed
against the euro.  The sterling ERI has remained within a
relatively narrow range since the start of 2009.
Although sterling was relatively stable against the
United Kingdom’s major trading partners, it depreciated
significantly against some of the United Kingdom’s smaller
trading partners.  For example, it depreciated by 7% against
the Swiss franc, and 5% against the yen, as part of the
‘flight to safety’ outlined in earlier sections.  The broad-based
appreciation of these two currencies prompted the SNB and
the Bank of Japan to intervene in foreign exchange markets. 
Forward-looking measures of exchange rate uncertainty rose
over the period, albeit only slightly.  Related measures
suggested that market participants have placed a greater
weight on sterling appreciating over the period (Chart 18).
According to contacts, that largely reflected investors being
willing to pay a higher price to buy protection against an


























(a) Non seasonally adjusted.
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Chart 17 Sterling ERI and bilateral exchange rates
programme eligible for this facility.  This programme has
subsequently issued SCP to the APF.
Gilt lending facility(5)
The Bank continued to offer to lend some of its gilt holdings
via the DMO in return for other UK government collateral.
In the three months to 30 June 2011, a daily average of
£2,371 million of gilts was lent as part of the gilt lending
facility.  This was an increase from an average of £1,476 million
in the previous quarter.  The increase reflected a perceived lack
of availability of particular gilts, which led market participants
to borrow from the DMO rather than obtain the gilts in the
market.
(1) The data cut-off for this box is 25 August 2011, unless otherwise stated.  For further
discussion on asset purchases see the Asset Purchase Facility Quarterly Report available
at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/markets/apf/quarterlyreport.htm.
(2) Further details of individual operations are available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/gilts/results.htm.
(3) The APF was initially authorised to purchase private sector assets financed by Treasury
bills and the DMO’s cash management operations.  Its remit was extended to enable
the Facility to be used as a monetary policy tool on 3 March 2009.  All purchases of
assets between 6 March 2009 and 4 February 2010 were financed by central bank
reserves.  Since 4 February 2010 all purchases have been financed by the issuance of
Treasury bills and the DMO’s cash management operations.
(4) The SCP facility is described in more detail in the Market Notice available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice090730.pdf.
(5) For more details on the gilt lending facility see the box ‘Gilt lending facility’ in the
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 4, page 253.194 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
The Bank of England’s foreign exchange
reserves
The Bank of England uses its balance sheet in pursuit of its
policy goals.  Ordinarily, this involves changes to the size or
composition of its sterling assets and liabilities.(1) But the Bank
also holds assets and liabilities denominated in foreign
currency.  This box describes how the Bank finances and invests
its foreign exchange reserves.
Institutional arrangements
Both the Bank and the UK Government hold foreign exchange
reserves.  But they are held for different purposes and in
segregated accounts.
The Government’s foreign exchange reserves are held in an
account called the Exchange Equalisation Account (the EEA).
The Bank manages these reserves as agent for the
Government, but they do not appear on the Bank’s balance
sheet.  Decisions on the size and composition of the EEA are
taken by the Government.  The EEA Act of 1979 defines the
possible uses for the Government’s foreign exchange reserves,
including ‘checking undue fluctuations in the exchange value of
sterling’.(2) The EEA was used to intervene in March 2011 when
the G7 nations sold Japanese yen as part of a co-ordinated
foreign exchange intervention.
The Bank’s foreign exchange reserves appear on its balance
sheet.  They can be used by the Bank to intervene in the foreign
exchange market in pursuit of its monetary policy objectives.(3)
The MPC has not decided to intervene in the foreign exchange
market since the inception of the 1997 monetary policy
framework.(4)
Financing of the reserves
Foreign exchange intervention would involve the sale or
purchase of sterling in the foreign exchange market with the
intention of influencing the sterling effective exchange rate.  To
be able to purchase sterling the Bank would need foreign
currency to sell.  In principle, the Bank could borrow foreign
currency directly in the capital markets at the time it wished to
purchase sterling.  The cost of doing so may however be greatly
exaggerated at those times.  The Bank therefore chooses to
hold foreign exchange reserves on its balance sheet on a
precautionary basis.
The Bank’s foreign exchange reserves are financed through
annual foreign currency bond issuance in the international
capital markets.(5) The bond issuance represents a foreign
currency liability on the Bank’s balance sheet.  The currency
denomination, maturity and size of each issue reflects the
Bank’s judgement on where the best value for money may be
achieved.
Since bond issuance commenced in 2007, they have been
denominated in US dollars, because this has been the most
cost-efficient currency of issuance.(6) Each bond issue has been
$2 billion in size and three years in maturity.  So at any one
point in time, these liabilities have financed foreign currency
assets of approximately $6 billion.  The proceeds from bond
issuance are invested in suitable assets of similar maturities.(7)
Reserve assets
Currency composition
The reserve assets held by the Bank are denominated in
US dollars, euro and yen, which are the three most-traded
currencies in the foreign exchange market and together
account for the majority of the sterling effective exchange rate
index.(8)
There is a currency mismatch between the dollar proceeds
from the bond issue, and the euro and yen assets that the Bank
wants to hold.  Cross-currency basis swaps are used to convert
the dollar proceeds to euro and yen, and hedge the resulting
foreign exchange risk.
Asset composition
At approximately $6 billion, the Bank’s foreign exchange
reserves are modest relative to the size of the sterling foreign
exchange market, and the holdings of most other major central
banks and the UK Government.  As a result it is important that
those reserves are highly liquid. 
The Bank’s reserve assets therefore consist only of high-quality
sovereign bonds that trade in consistently deep and liquid
markets.  These sovereign bonds have remained liquid through
recent market volatility, and the Bank judges that they would
most likely remain liquid in future periods of market stress too.
The Bank will publish more details on its foreign exchange
reserves in its Annual Report and Accounts in the future.
The Bank regularly reviews its reserve assets to ensure they
meet their policy purpose.  This requires ongoing assessment of
the credit quality and liquidity of the Bank’s sovereign bond
holdings.
(1) See for example, Cross, M, Fisher, P and Weeken, O (2010), ‘The Bank’s balance sheet
during the crisis’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 1, pages 34–42. 
(2) www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/30. 
(3) This was set out in the new Monetary Policy Framework introduced by the
Government in 1997.  See www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_40_97letter.htm.
(4) Intervention has been discussed on several occasions and those discussions were
reported in the relevant minutes of the MPC meeting.  See, for example, paragraph 41
in the minutes of the meeting held on 3–4 May 2000, available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2000/mpc0005.pdf.
(5) More information on the bonds issued by the Bank can be found on the Bank’s website
at www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/reserves/index.htm. 
(6) Prior to 2007, the foreign exchange reserves were funded through a Euro Note
programme.  
(7) Assets are chosen with maturities similar to the liability to minimise interest rate risk.
Interest rate swaps are also used to hedge interest rate risk.
(8) The most recent survey by the Bank for International Settlements in April 2010
contains statistics on global foreign exchange turnover:
www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf10t.pdf.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 195
Market intelligence on developments in
market structure
In discharging its responsibilities to maintain monetary
stability and contribute to financial stability, the Bank gathers
information from contacts across a wide spectrum of financial
markets.  This intelligence helps inform the Bank’s assessment
of monetary conditions and possible sources of financial
instability and is routinely synthesised with research and
analysis in the Inflation Report and the Financial Stability
Report.  More generally, regular dialogue with market contacts
provides valuable insights into how markets function,
providing context for policy formulation, including the design
and evaluation of the Bank’s own market operations.  And the
Bank conducts occasional market surveys to gather additional
quantitative information on certain markets.
Based on intelligence of this kind, this section describes recent
developments in the structured notes market.  It also describes
changes to the way gilt repo transactions can be settled.  
Recent developments in the structured notes market
Structured notes are debt instruments which pay coupons, and
a final redemption value, linked to asset prices.  Understanding
developments in the structured notes market is important
from a financial stability perspective.(1) This is because they
act as a source of funding for banks that lie at the heart of the
financial system.  This funding may vary with market
conditions.  Moreover, structured notes can create risks that
banks might find difficult to manage, impacting the
functioning of certain markets.  And they can provide insights
into the extent to which investors are prepared to take greater
risks in pursuit of higher returns.  This section describes recent
developments in the structured notes market, drawing on
intelligence gathered from discussions with contacts. 
Description of structured notes
A structured note is a debt instrument which pays coupons
that are linked to the returns of an underlying asset using
derivatives (usually options, futures or swaps).  They are
typically unsecured debt obligations, meaning that investors
are exposed to the risk that an issuer will default.  Investors are
attracted to structured notes because they allow them to
tailor returns to more closely match their preferences.  While
issuers are mainly attracted to structured notes because they
allow them to raise funding from an investor base that is
perceived to be diversified, and often at cheaper rates than
from conventional medium-term notes.
Most structured notes provide returns linked to interest rates
or equity markets (Chart 19).  Together they account for
approximately 80% of structured notes.  But there are also
structured notes that provide returns linked to other markets,
including commodity and foreign exchange markets.
Structured notes come in a variety of forms, with differing
degrees of complexity.  But there are broadly three types of
structured notes:  principal-protected notes, yield-enhancing
notes and participation notes.
￿ Principal-protected notes guarantee that an investor’s initial
investment will be returned upon maturity, while providing
positive returns if asset prices evolve in a pre-specified way
(eg the FTSE 100 index increases).  In their simplest form,
these notes essentially replicate the returns from buying a














Issuance amount (US$ billions)                       
2003 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
H1 H1 H1 H1
Source:  mtn-i.com. 
Chart 19 Issuance of structured medium-term notes by
type of underlying asset 
(1) For a more detailed review of financial stability implications, see Rule, D, Garratt, A
and Rummel, O (2004), ‘Structured note markets:  products, participants and links
to wholesale derivatives markets’, Bank of England Financial Stability Review, June,
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(a) Returns are defined as the logarithmic difference between current forward rate and the spot
rate at the maturity date of the contract.
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Chart 18 Three-month option-implied skewness of
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￿ Yield-enhancing notes pay coupons that exceed those
offered by conventional notes provided asset prices evolve
in a pre-specified way.  But investors can lose all or some
portion of their initial investment if asset prices do not
evolve in this way.  For example, a structured note might
pay a coupon of 5% and return the initial investment if the
FTSE 100 does not fall in value.  But if the FTSE falls in value,
only some portion of the initial investment will be returned.
In their simplest form, these types of notes essentially
replicate the returns from buying a zero-coupon bond of the
issuer, while selling an option.
￿ Participation notes tailor the returns from investing in a
specific asset, sometimes by limiting the potential gains and
losses.  These types of notes often replicate the returns from
investing in futures contracts, and buying and selling
options with various strike prices.
Structured notes can be complex.  For example, some of the
embedded options have complicated pay-off profiles, which
can create risks that are difficult for banks to manage and may
increase the risk of mispricing the security.  Some provide
returns linked to the evolution of more than one asset price.
They include a credit risk exposure to the issuer or
counterparty to the transaction.  And the ultimate maturity of
some types of structured notes are dependent on the
evolution of asset prices, perhaps because they can be called
by issuers, or put back by investors.
Market participants
Investors in structured notes typically fall in three broad
groups:  high net worth individuals, retail investors and
institutional investors.  High net worth individuals and retail
investors often invest in structured notes to access return
profiles that they cannot achieve using other securities
available to them, or because alternatives are more expensive.
Institutional investors, such as insurance companies, also
invest in structured notes for this purpose.  But they also invest
in structured notes to more closely align the expected returns
from their assets with their liabilities.  Perhaps for this reason,
institutional investors, which tend to have long-term liabilities,
tend to invest in structured notes with maturities exceeding
ten years.  Retail and high net worth investors tend to invest
for shorter maturities, typically less than seven years.
Commercial banks are the largest issuers of structured notes
(Chart 20).  European banks, including some UK banks, are
particularly large issuers, since they are in a strong position to
capitalise on the robust demand from European high net worth
and retail investors through their branch networks.  For
example, contacts suggest that in 2010 around 10%–20% of
major UK banks’ term funding was via structured notes.
US banks were prominent issuers prior to 2008, but some have
reportedly scaled back their involvement since.  Sovereign and
supranational agencies are also large issuers.
Benefits and drawbacks to issuance of structured notes
Contacts at banks perceive there to be two main benefits from
structured note issuance.  First, they provide a diversified
source of funding, which tends to be cheaper than
conventional medium-term notes.  Contacts say that investors
are willing to forego some returns in order to access the
tailored returns that structured notes provide.  Second, they
allow banks to hedge some risks that arise from the trading of
derivatives, thus complementing this part of their business.
But there are also some drawbacks to structured note
issuance.  Issuers and investors expect banks to buy and sell
their own structured notes, or those of other issuers in the
secondary market (‘market-making’).  This means that a bank
might have to repurchase its notes during periods of stress,
when their need for funding is highest.  And second, managing
the embedded derivatives positions from complex structured
notes can be difficult.  These difficulties can be exacerbated in
stressed market conditions, when liquidity dries up, or if issuers
have sold similar notes in large size.
Recent trends in issuance
Estimating the size of the global structured notes market is
difficult because a large portion of issuance is conducted via
private placements.  And monitoring whether notes have been
repurchased, or called by the issuer, is also difficult.
But publicly available data suggest that structured note
issuance fell sharply in the second half of 2008, having grown
rapidly prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008
(Chart 20).  Moreover, investors switched from investing in
complex yield-enhancing notes towards principal-protected
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Chart 20 Issuance of structured medium-term notes by
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Issuance recovered during 2009, and was increasingly
accounted for by commercial banks, as fears about the credit
risk of banks abated somewhat (Chart 20).  More recently,
yield-enhancing notes have once again become the most
popular form of structured note.
But contacts noted that structured notes tended to be less
complex than was the case prior to 2008.  This reduction in
complexity is thought to be a result of two factors.  First,
issuers are pricing complex structured notes less attractively
than prior to the crisis.  This arose from the difficulties they
faced managing the associated risks during late 2008, when
liquidity dried up in a number of markets.  And second,
investors currently demand higher returns to compensate
them for taking bank credit risk, negating the need for
investors with nominal return targets to engineer higher
returns via greater complexity.
Introduction of CREST Term DBV
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, an increased level of
regulatory scrutiny has been applied to the settlement and
payment arrangements that support repo markets.(1) In these
markets, repo transactions can be used for short-term
borrowing or lending against collateral.  The introduction of
‘Term DBV’ on 1 July 2011 marks a significant change to the
way gilt repo can be settled.  Similar risk-mitigating initiatives
are being progressed in a number of countries,(2)for example
to tri-party repo in the United States.(3) This section describes
Term DBV and how it will benefit the UK gilt repo market.
In the United Kingdom, gilts, equities and money market
instruments are settled in CREST — a securities settlement
system operated by Euroclear UK & Ireland Limited (EUI), the
central securities depository.
Use of Delivery by Value 
A high proportion of repo is settled by means of the
Delivery-by-Value (DBV) settlement mechanism.  It is a
low-cost, reliable and efficient way of delivering multiple lines
of collateral either to cover cash lending or as a collateral
delivery mechanism in its own right to cover exposures
between CREST members.
Technically, the transacting parties simply agree on the type of
securities to be delivered (using pre-defined sets of securities
in the CREST system) and the value of the securities to be
delivered.  Prior to 1 July 2011, the CREST system settled repo
transactions only in overnight DBV.  This meant the system
selected a package of securities to the required value, delivered
it in the afternoon DBV settlement window and returned it the
following morning when CREST settlement starts.
Participants
DBV is used by the principal participants in the gilt repo
market such as major banks, Gilt-edged Market Makers
(GEMMs), interdealer brokers, life assurance and pension
funds, the UK Debt Management Office, and by the Bank in its
open market operations.(4) DBV settled in the CREST system
has a value of around £180 billion per day, which typically
accounts for around 70% of all sterling settlement in CREST.(5)
A large proportion of DBV trades in the gilt repo market are
centrally cleared through the LCH.Clearnet Ltd RepoClear
service (RepoClear), where two parties submit trades to the
clearing house which then nets and settles the trades within
CREST.  The true size of the DBV market, which would include
gross trades prior to netting by RepoClear, is consequently
larger than £180 billion.  Once netted, DBVs input to CREST by
RepoClear account for approximately 40% of daily settled
DBV trades. 
Disadvantages of overnight DBV
While ideally suited for the settlement of repos with an
overnight term, overnight DBV is also used to settle repos with
terms of greater than one day.  For example, the
value-weighted-average term of underlying DBV-based repos
submitted to the RepoClear service is around eight calendar
days.(6) The RepoClear service settles these term deals in
CREST as a series of daily overnight DBVs.
Use of overnight DBV to settle underlying term repos
introduces two main risks.  First, the settlement of the trade
unwinds each morning and so needs to be re-input (rolled)
each day until maturity.  This introduces operational risk.  For
example, the money market would be exposed to potentially
significant disruption in the event of either an intraday failure
of market infrastructure or the inability of one or more major
participants to input their DBV trades for that afternoon’s
settlement.
Second, the use of overnight DBVs increases the value of
intraday liquidity that the Bank provides to settlement banks.
The daily unwind of overnight DBV routinely creates an
intraday funding requirement that is met by intraday liquidity
provision by the Bank until it is offset by DBV re-input each
afternoon.  The Bank is willing to provide intraday liquidity to
settlement banks (subject to provision of eligible collateral) in
order to support efficient payment and settlement.  However,
it seeks that the design of settlement processes should be
liquidity-efficient and not require undue reliance on the
provision of intraday liquidity by the Bank.
(1) Settlement means that the ownership of an asset is transferred from one party to the
other, with a simultaneous transfer of cash in the other direction.  
(2) For example, see the 2010 BIS Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems
(CPSS) recommendations on repo market infrastructure, available at
www.bis.org/publ/cpss91.htm.
(3) For more information, see www.newyorkfed.org/tripartyrepo/index.html.
(4) DBV is also much used by the stock lending community to cover borrowing positions
with both gilts and equities. 
(5) Data from period June to August 2011.
(6) Over the period January to August 2011.198 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
The extension of intraday liquidity also exposes the Bank to
collateralised counterparty credit risk.  On average, over the
quarter to end-August 2011, the Bank’s balance sheet
expanded by around 50% during the day.(1) While such
intraday liquidity is collateralised by high-quality assets with
prudent haircuts, there is always a residual risk that market
prices will move significantly at times of stress and the Bank
may not be able to recover the full value of a loan in the event
of a counterparty default.(2) Such risks are judged to be small,
but as they are not zero it is prudent for the Bank to keep the
amount of intraday liquidity created to the minimum needed
to facilitate the flow of liquidity around the system.
Introduction of Term DBV
In order to address these inefficiencies and reduce risk in the
repo market, the option to settle term repos using Term DBV
was introduced into CREST on 1 July 2011 to complement the
existing overnight DBV option.  The new mechanism allows
trades to be transacted for a period of more than one night
without having to be re-input, matched, settled and unwound
in the CREST system every day.  This is demonstrated in
Figure 1 below.
Consequently, use of Term DBV will reduce the operational risk
inherent in settlement activity;  it will also reduce demand for
intraday liquidity from the settlement banks, which in turn
reduces the intraday expansion of the Bank’s balance sheet.
The introduction of Term DBV required a number of changes to
the CREST system.  First, automated mark-to-market
processing was introduced so that the value of collateral
provided in the transaction would be maintained even if the
price of the underlying securities changed over the life of the
trade.  Second, an automated process was initiated to allow for
the substitution of securities to meet the collateral-giver’s
security liquidity needs during the life of the Term DBV.
Since Term DBV was implemented in July 2011, there has been
a steady increase in the market’s use of this method of
settlement:  at end-August, around £7 billion of gilt repo was
held in Term DBV, accounting for 4% of the DBV market;  eight
market participants have chosen to settle gilt repo using
Term DBV.  Since its launch, several contacts have stated their
support of the introduction of Term DBV and have
acknowledged the risk-reducing benefits that it brings to the
gilt repo market.
At present, it is not possible for Term DBV to be centrally
cleared.  LCH.Clearnet Ltd and EUI are working with their
clients in the repo market to determine the viability and design
of a centrally cleared Term DBV product.  If that proves
possible, it is expected that the market’s use of Term DBV will
rise further.
Given the risk-reduction benefits of using Term DBV, the Bank
is supportive of the market’s growing adoption of this
method of settlement.(3) Since its launch, Term DBV was
used in the settlement of the Bank’s July and August 2011
indexed long-term repo operations.  Of the DBV collateral
provided by the Bank’s counterparties, over 40% was settled
using Term DBV.  The Bank is minded to discontinue the use
of rolling overnight DBV in its operations at some point in
the future.
(1) Over the quarter to end-August 2011, the Bank’s balance sheet on average was around
£238 billion at close of business, and expanded to around £360 billion during the day
in order to provide liquidity for CHAPS and CREST settlement.
(2) The Bank’s collateral risk management is described in Breeden, S and Whisker, R
(2010), ‘Collateral risk management at the Bank of England’, Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 2, pages 94–103.
(3) See page 9 of the speech by Chris Salmon on 5 July 2011, available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech508.pdf.
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To cover a four-day repo, an
overnight DBV is input and settled
each day to transfer gilts between
parties.  The following day, a
return transaction settles in the
morning.  This leads to the process
of input and settlement again that
afternoon.
The multiple ﬂows in this example
cause operational risk and
generate the need for additional
intraday liquidity as described on
pages 197 and 198. 
To cover a four-day repo, a Term
DBV is input and settled once on
the start date, to mature
automatically on day four.  In
between the start and maturity
dates, automatically generated
transactions are created where
necessary.  This could be to realign
the value of the original trade or
to substitute speciﬁc securities if
they are needed by the collateral
giver to honour an agreed sale.        
  
The blue arrows represent a value of DBV securities.
The red arrow represents a stock-only margin call automatically generated
to preserve the collateral value of the original Term DBV.  This can work in
both directions between parties.
The green arrows represent automatically generated substitution
transactions.           
Figure 1 Introduction of Term DBV to CREST